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Janus, Union Member Speech, and the Public Employee
Speech Doctrine
M. Linton Wright*

Abstract
In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), the Supreme Court held that
public sector unions can no longer collect fees from nonmembers
to fund the costs of representing them in collective bargaining
and grievance proceedings.1 The Court determined that virtually
all union speech is political speech and that collection of these
fees is impermissible compelled speech under the First
Amendment. However, not everything in Janus harms public
union interests. The Janus Court’s discussion of Garcetti v.
Cabellos and Connick v. Myers actually helps protect union
member speech in the context of First Amendment retaliation
cases.2 This Article argues that, after Janus, speech by union
representatives on behalf of their union is not “employee speech”
under Garcetti and is almost always a matter of public concern
under Connick. Further, this Article argues that ordinary union
member speech and union grievance filings are not “employee
speech” either. In support of the latter, this Article also looks to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane v. Franks3 as well as the
nature of union membership generally.

The author serves as a clerk for Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Terry Fox.
The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the views
of his former employer, the Colorado Office of the Attorney General. The
author thanks Professor Alan Chen and Judge Terry Fox for reviewing
previous versions of this Article, as well as Professor Nancy Ehrenreich for her
advice during the research process. Lastly, the author would not have
completed this Article without the support of his wife, Louise.
1. 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).
2. Id.
3. 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
*
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Introduction
Many commentators have declared that the Supreme
Court’s recent First Amendment decision in Janus v. AFSCME4
severely weakens the power of public sector unions.5 In Janus,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits
public sector unions from collecting “agency fees,” which are
dues non-union members must pay to compensate unions for
representing them in collective bargaining and grievance
procedures.6 This decision overrules Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,7 which held that public sector unions could collect
such fees from non-members so long as the union used the
money for non-political purposes. The Court now holds that all
agreements to collect fees from non-union members violate “the
free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public
concern.”8 Thus, virtually all union speech is now effectively a
form of political speech from which non-union members have a
right to withhold their financial support.9
The Janus decision left many wondering if the First
Amendment could serve the interests of public sector unions and
their supporters.10 However, parts of the Court’s decision in
Janus actually protect public union interests in certain
contexts.11 One commentator recently noted that Janus might
protect public union interests in cases of public employer
4. Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448.
5. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor
Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/p
olitics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html; Dylan Matthews, 6
Excerpts that Explain the Supreme Court’s Big Anti-Union Ruling, VOX (June
27, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/27/17509460/supreme-courtjanus-afscme-public-sector-union-alito-kagan-dissent.
6. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460.
7. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
8. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460.
9. Id.; see also Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First
Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2062–63 (2018).
10. See Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/3
0/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html.
11. See infra Part II; see also Fisk, supra note 9, at 2062–63; Janus, 138
S.Ct. 2448.
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retaliation against employees for their union-related speech. 12
This Article argues that the Janus decision and other recent
Court rulings help protect public employees from retaliation for
their speech as union representatives, union members, and for
filing union grievances.
The First Amendment protects the free speech rights of
public employees and prevents employers from retaliating
against employees because of their speech under certain
circumstances.13 Specifically, public employers cannot retaliate
against an employee when that employee speaks “as a citizen . . .
[on] matters of public concern” and when the employee’s free
speech interests outweigh the government’s interests in
maintaining an effective workplace.14 However, when an
employee speaks, not as a citizen but pursuant to their “official
duties” or speaks on matters of private as opposed to public
concern, the employee enjoys no First Amendment protection. 15
Under those circumstances, a public employer is free to retaliate
against that employee for their speech under the First
Amendment.
In addressing public employee retaliation cases, the Federal
Circuits are divided as to the precise nature of employees’ unionrelated speech.16 For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that
an employee’s speech as a union representative or member is
never speech tied to the employee’s job responsibilities.17
However, the Second Circuit refused to declare, categorically,
that an employee’s speech as a union member is never speech
pursuant to that employee’s job duties.18 This Article aims to
resolve the issue in the Sixth Circuit’s favor.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Supreme
Court’s public employee speech doctrine and surveys Circuit
court cases addressing when an employee’s union speech is
citizen speech on matters of public concern. Part II of this
12. Theo A. Lesczynski, Redefining Workplace Speech After Janus, 113
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 885, 911–14 (2019).
13. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
14. Id.
15. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006).
16. See infra Part I(C).
17. See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015).
18. Montero v. Police Ass’n of City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 389–99
(2d Cir. 2018).
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Article begins by examining Janus’ implications for an
employee’s union speech under the public employee speech
doctrine. It notes that Janus determined that speech on behalf
of a union in collective bargaining and grievance proceedings (1)
is not speech pursuant to an employee’s job duties and (2) almost
always involves matters of substantial public concern.19
Part II of this Article then argues that a public employee’s
speech in his or her capacity as an ordinary union member or an
employee’s filing of a union grievance is speech as a citizen and
not speech pursuant to their ordinary or official job duties under
Janus, Garcetti,20 and Lane.21 It argues that Janus’ reasoning
regarding speech on behalf of unions in collective bargaining and
grievance procedures should apply with equal force to speech by
ordinary union members. This Article also argues that the
Court’s decision in Lane eliminated certain broad
interpretations of Garcetti and thus undermines the rationale of
Weintraub v. Board of Education, a Second Circuit case which
held that an employee’s union grievance was speech consistent
with his job duties.22 It maintains that the fundamental purpose
and structure of unions strongly supports the position that an
employee’s speech as a union member, or in filing a union
grievance, is not speech pursuant to his or her ordinary or
official job responsibilities. Finally, the Article concludes with a
brief discussion of the circumstances under which employees
speak as union members.
I. Background
A. The Supreme Court’s Public Employee Speech Doctrine
The modern era of the Supreme Court’s public employee
speech jurisprudence began with Pickering v. Board of
Education.23 In Pickering, the Board of Education in Township,
Illinois fired a teacher at Township High school after the teacher
19. See also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 902–04.
20. See generally Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410.
21. See generally Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
22. 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010).
23. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of
Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 304 (2015).
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wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board’s
fundraising activities.24 The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protected the teacher’s speech, declaring that there
must be “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.”25 In
balancing these competing interests, the Court reasoned that
the letter did not interfere with the teacher’s ability to instruct
his students or the school’s ability to operate normally.26 Thus,
Pickering established that the First Amendment protects public
employee speech on matters of public concern unless the state
can demonstrate that its interest in efficient operations
outweighs the speech interests of the employee.27
Pickering did not make entirely clear the extent to which
the First Amendment protected public employee speech on
private matters, but the Supreme Court later clarified that the
First Amendment only protected public employee speech on
matters of public concern in Connick v. Myers.28 In Connick, an
Assistant District Attorney named Shylia Myers drafted and
distributed a memorandum asking for other employee’s opinions
on the office transfer policy, employee morale, and the office’s
lack of a grievance committee.29 Myers’ superior fired her for
distributing the letter.30
The Supreme Court ruled against Myers, holding that the
First Amendment did not protect her speech because her letter
did not comment on matters of public concern.31 The Court
stated that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement.”32 Further, it characterized speech
24. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
25. Id. at 568.
26. Id. at 569–70.
27. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 212 (4th. ed. 2014);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1149
(4th ed. 2011).
28. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
29. Id. at 141.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id. at 147–148.
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on matters of public concern as “relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.”33 In this
case, the Court determined Myer’s questionnaire did not
comment on matters of public concern because it did not seek to
publicly evaluate the conduct of the District Attorney as an
elected official or bring attention to any actual or potential
wrongdoing within the office.34
In 2006, the Supreme Court substantially altered the
application of the First Amendment to public employee speech.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,35 the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office allegedly retaliated against Richard Ceballos,
a deputy district attorney, for drafting a memo in which he
questioned the veracity of a police affidavit that provided the
basis for a search warrant.36 Cabellos sued the district
attorney’s office, arguing the office’s retaliation violated his First
Amendment rights.37
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
apply to Cabello’s speech.38 Specifically, the Court found that
Cabello drafted his memo “pursuant to his duties as a calendar
deputy”39 and declared that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”40 In reaching this decision, the Court
emphasized that it did not want courts to oversee public
employers’ management or discipline of public employees “in the
course of official business.”41
However, the Court did not provide much guidance on how
to determine when a public employee speaks pursuant to or in
the scope of his official duties.42 The Court stated that employers
cannot circumvent First Amendment rights by crafting
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 146.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
See generally 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 413–15.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006).
Id. at 424; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1148.
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“excessively broad job descriptions” and that “the proper inquiry
is a practical one.”43 Thus, Garcetti established that the First
Amendment does not apply to public employee speech related to
the scope of their job duties.44
The Court revisited the issue of public employee speech
pursuant to employee job duties in Lane v. Franks.45 In Lane,
Edward Lane, the director of a youth outreach program at
Alabama Community College, discovered that an Alabama state
representative was on the College’s payroll but never actually
reported to her office.46 Lane confronted the representative, and
when she refused to report to the college, Lane fired her.47 Lane
later testified on multiple occasions about the state
representative and his decision to fire her.48 Steve Franks,
President of the College, fired Lane shortly after he testified.49
Lane sued Franks, arguing that Franks violated the First
Amendment by retaliating against him for his testimony.50
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lane and held that the
First Amendment protects a public employee who provides
truthful, sworn testimony outside the scope of the employee’s
“ordinary job responsibilities.”51
Addressing the issue of
whether Lane testified as a citizen or as an employee, the Court
found that Lane spoke as a citizen even though he “learned of
the subject matter of that testimony in the course of his
employment.”52 The Court declared that “the mere fact that a
citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his
public employment does not transform that speech into
employee—rather than citizen—speech.”53 The Court reasoned
that this result is consistent with Garcetti because that Court’s
holding “did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue
‘concerned the subject matter of [the prosecutor’s]
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
Id.
See generally 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2006).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 240.
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employment.’”54 Further, the Court stated that the proper
inquiry under Garcetti is whether the employee’s speech is
“ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether
it merely concerns those duties.”55
Most recently, the Supreme Court discussed Pickering,
Connick, and Garcetti in Janus v. AFSCME.56 As mentioned,
this case addressed the constitutionality of contracts and
statutes requiring non-union members to pay agency fees for
certain public sector union activities that benefit nonmembers,
such as representation in collective bargaining and grievance
procedures.57 The Court found that agency fees are a form of
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment,58 but in
an attempt to convince the Court otherwise, the AFSCME and
its amici attempted to use Pickering and its progeny in
surprising ways.59
The AFSCME argued that the First
Amendment does not apply to the union’s collection of agency
fees because those fees and the activities they support are (a)
speech pursuant to a nonmember’s job duties and (b) speech that
addresses only matters of private concern.60
The Court began its discussion the public employee speech
doctrine by noting that the Pickering line of cases does not fit
well with the facts at issue in Janus.61 First, the Court stated
that agency-fee cases deal with “broad categories of employees”
while the Pickering cases deal with government restrictions of
individual employee speech.62 Cases involving “widespread”
speech implications like agency fees are of more serious concern
than individual speech restrictions, and the Court affords less
deference to the Government in assessing the potential harm

54. Id. at 239 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006))
(alteration in original).
55. Id. at 240.
56. 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2471–77 (2018).
57. Id. at 2460.
58. Id. at 2486.
59. See id. at 2471–78.
60. Id. at 2474–77.
61. Id. at 2472–74.
62. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2472–73 (2018). For example, the
Court stated that when a single employee asks for a 5% raise, it is likely not a
matter of public concern; however, when a union asks for a 5% raise on behalf
of thousands of employees, it likely is a matter of public concern. Id.
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under the First Amendment.63 Second, agency-fee cases deal
with compelled speech while Pickering cases deal with speech
restrictions.64 According to the Court, “the calculus is very
different” when considering government compelled speech
versus restricted speech, and the Court has never applied
Pickering in compelled speech cases.65 Lastly, while both the
Court’s agency-fee cases and Pickering cases divide speech into
political and non-political speech, the “categorization schemes do
not line up” perfectly.66 Abood flatly forbids compelling nonunion employees to pay for political speech, but Pickering allows
the government to restrict an employee’s political speech if the
government has a sufficient interest in doing so.67
Despite the Court’s skepticism about the Pickering cases’
applicability, it went on to fully consider the union’s arguments
under the public employee speech doctrine.68 First, the Court
rejected the union’s argument that union speech in collective
bargaining and grievance proceedings is speech pursuant to an
employee’s job duties under Garcetti.69 The Court declared that
the union’s Garcetti argument “distorts collective bargaining
and grievance adjustment beyond recognition.”70 The Janus
Court stated that an employee’s speech pursuant to his job
duties is really the employer’s speech and in those scenarios an
“employee is effectively the employer’s spokesperson.”71
However, union negotiation or representation of employees in
collective bargaining or grievance proceedings is speech on
behalf of employees, not the employer.72 To hold otherwise would
be nonsensical and lead to results unacceptable to public sector
unions in any other circumstance.73

63. Id.
64. Id.; see also William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies
and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 176 (2018).
65. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2473.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2474.
68. Id. at 2474–78.
69. Id. at 2474.
70. Id.
71. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The Court proceeded to reject the union’s argument under
Connick74 as well, holding that union speech in collective
bargaining and grievance proceedings addresses significant
matters of public concern such as expenditure of public money,
education, child welfare, healthcare, minority rights, climate
change, sexual orientation, gender identity, evolution, and
religion.75 Lastly, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test
and determined that the non-union members’ First Amendment
rights against compelled speech far outweigh the state’s and the
union’s interests in imposing agency fees.76
B.

Federal Circuit Applications of Garcetti and Connick
Generally

In Garcetti, the Supreme Court did not announce a specific
formula or test for determining when an employee speaks as a
citizen or pursuant to his job duties.77 While the Court
mentioned a few factors for lower courts to consider,78 it stated
that it had “no occasion to articulate a comprehensive
framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases
where there is room for serious debate.”79 Thus, Federal Circuits
have developed their own, additional factors for determining
when an employee speaks pursuant or his or her job duties.80
For example, the First Circuit considers the following
factors: (1) whether the employer commissioned or paid for the
employee’s speech; (2) the subject matter of the speech; (3)
whether the employee directed the speech up the chain of
command; (4) whether the employee spoke while at work; (5)
whether outsiders thought the employee spoke for the employer
in making the speech; (6) whether the speech involved special
knowledge the employee learning as a result of his or her
74. Id. at 2474–77.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2477–78.
77. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
78. Id. at 424–25 (stating that speech pursuant to an employee’s job
duties has no analogue to citizen speech and that employers cannot turn all
employee speech into official job duties speech via excessively-broad job
descriptions).
79. Id. at 424.
80. See, e.g., 5 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 1:18 (2019).
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employment; and (7) whether a “citizen analogue” exists in
comparison to the employee’s speech.81 Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit has identified the following factors as relevant: “(1)
speaking with the objective of advancing official duties; (2)
harnessing workplace resources; (3) projecting official authority;
(4) heeding official directives; and (5) observing formal
workplace hierarchies.”82
However, Garcetti emphasized that “the proper inquiry is a
practical one,”83 and lower courts have stated that no single
factor is dispositive in determining when employees speak
pursuant to their job duties.84 For example, “an employee’s job
description is not dispositive” and “speech may be entitled to
constitutional protection even when it is made at work about
work.”85 Courts must closely examine the facts of each case in
making their determination.86
Federal Circuits have somewhat differing views on Connick
as well. Like Garcetti, Connick did not provide a comprehensive
framework for determining when speech is of public concern
beyond that courts must consider “the content, form, and context
of a given statement.”87 Some Courts consider the content of an
employee’s speech to be the most important factor.88 Some
Courts also consider the speaker’s motivation to be critical,89
though others consider the speaker’s motive to be nondispositive.90
Employee speech involving government
81. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011); Meagher v.
Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015).
82. Fernandez v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 898 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2018).
83. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
84. See, e.g., Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 713
(10th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 714.
86. Id.
87. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
88. See, e.g., Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2012); Nagle v. Village of Calumet, 554 F.3d 1106, 1123 (7th Cir. 2009).
89. See, e.g., Denton v. Yancey, 661 F. App’x. 933, 937 (10th Cir. 2016)
(stating “we focus on the motive of the speaker and whether the speech is
calculated to disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and
grievances unrelated to the public’s interest”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90. Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting “the motive
of the speaker is a relevant, though not dispositive, factor because speech will
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impropriety is usually of public concern,91 but mere personal
dissatisfaction with a government entity’s policies is not.92
C. Union Member Speech in the Federal Circuits
The First Amendment protects the right of public employees
to associate with a union.93 However, whether the First
Amendment protects public employees from retaliation for
speaking on union-related matters depends on the nature of the
speech and the position of the speaker.94 Federal Circuit Courts
have reached differing conclusions regarding union-related
speech under Garcetti and Connick.
The Federal Circuit courts generally hold that when a public
employee speaks as a representative of a union, the employee
speaks as a citizen under Garcetti. In Fuerst v. Clarke, the
Seventh Circuit held that a police officer’s public criticism of an
elected-sheriff was not speech pursuant to his job duties because
the officer spoke in his capacity as the President of the local
police union.95 Similarly, in Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, the
Ninth Circuit held that “[g]iven the inherent institutional
not be protected if the only point of the speech was to further some purely
private interest”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d
164, 171 (2nd Cir. 2009); Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 269 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting “to conclude, as the defendants would have us do, that a
personal complaint . . . affecting only the complaining employee can never
amount to an issue of public concern could improperly limit the range of speech
that is protected by the First Amendment”) (emphasis in original).
91. See Swineford v. Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3rd Cir. 1994).
92. See Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 715–17 (9th
Cir. 2009).
93. See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,
465 (1979).
94. Frisenda v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 775 F. Supp. 2d 486, 509 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (stating “an employee’s association with a union, as well as
any speech that arises from his or her position in a union, is constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment”).
95. 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting that “[b]ecause Fuerst’s
comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made
in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his
employment as a deputy sheriff—his duties as deputy sheriff did not include
commenting on the sheriff’s decision to hire a public-relations officer—the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos . . . is inapposite”)
(citations omitted); see also Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 895–96 (7th Cir.
2014); Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 747–49 (7th Cir. 2014).
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conflict of interest between an employer and its employees’
union, we conclude that a police officer does not act in
furtherance of his public duties when speaking as a
representative of the police union.”96
The Second and Sixth Circuits have reached similar
conclusions.97 However, a District Court within the Third
Circuit held that a police officer and union president “was not
acting as a private citizen when engaging in speech as a public
employee and President of the [local police] union because such
speech was performed while Plaintiff was in his official capacity
as negotiator of his union.”98
A deeper split exists among the Circuits as to whether a
public employee speaks pursuant to his job duties when the
employee speaks as a mere member of a union. The Sixth Circuit
has held that “[i]t is axiomatic that an employee’s job
responsibilities do not include acting in the capacity of a union
member, leader, or official.”99 However, in Montero v. City of
Yonkers, the Second Circuit declined to declare, categorically,
that employee speech in his or her capacity as a union member
is speech as a citizen under the First Amendment.100 While the
Second Circuit found that a police officer and union
representative spoke as a citizen under the facts of Montero,101
it refused to extend that holding to all union member speech.
The depth of the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding union
member speech is thin: Its analysis consists solely of a rejection
of the officer’s reliance on Clue v. Johnson,102 a pre-Garcetti case
that addressed whether speech made pursuant to union
96. 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
97. See Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Montero
v. Police Ass’n of the City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 398 (2d Cir. 2018).
98. Beresford v. Wall Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 08-2236 (JAP), 2010 WL
445684, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2010). The Third Circuit approved of this
reasoning in Killon v. Coffey, 696 Fed. App’x 76, 79 n.4 (3rd Cir. 2017); see also
Hill v. City of Phila., No. 05-6574, 2008 WL 2622907, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 30,
2008), aff’d, 331 Fed. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating “[a]ny activity or related
speech which allegedly led to retaliation against [plaintiff] was conducted
pursuant to his official duties as a union delegate acting on behalf of employees
of a municipal agency, and not as a citizen”).
99. Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534.
100. 890 F.3d at 398–99.
101. Id. at 398.
102. 179 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 1999).
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activities raise matters of public concern.103 The Second Circuit
offered no positive argument for its refusal to declare that all
employee speech as a union member is considered citizen speech
under Garcetti.104
Similarly, in Killon v. Coffey, the Third Circuit accepted the
district court’s holding that police officers and union members
who advocated for their department to implement twelve-hour
shifts spoke as employees and rejected the officers’ argument
that Garcetti does not apply to union activity.105 The District
Court did not contest the officers’ assertion that they spoke as
union members but nonetheless held that they spoke pursuant
to their job duties “because of their employment as police officers
and the special knowledge and experience acquired through that
employment.”106
When an employee spoke on union-related matters but not
as union representative or member, the Eleventh Circuits
declared that the employee spoke pursuant to his job duties. In
Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines,107 the Eleventh Circuit held that
an Assistant Fire Chief’s critical comments to the local union
president and other employees about the City’s behavior during
collective bargaining negotiations was speech pursuant to his job
duties.108 The Court stated that the employees sought the
Assistant Chief’s opinion because of his “experience and
leadership role in the department and on the pension board.”109
Federal Circuit courts have also addressed whether an
employee’s filing of a union grievance is speech as a citizen or as
an employee under Garcetti. The leading case on this issue is
Weintraub v. Board of Education.110 In considering whether a
school teacher’s grievance against his school was citizen speech,
the Second Circuit held that “by filing a grievance with his union
103. Montero, 890 F.3d at 399.
104. See id.
105. 696 F. App’x at 78–79 n.4.
106. Killion v. Coffey, No. 13-1808 (RMB/KMW), 2016 WL 5417193, at
*11 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 76 (3rd Cir. 2017).
107. 782 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 619. The Assistant Fire Chief was active in the union for many
years but ceased to be a member of the bargaining unit when he accepted his
management position. Id. at 616.
109. Id. at 620.
110. 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010).
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to complain about his supervisor’s failure to discipline a child in
his classroom, [the teacher] was speaking pursuant to his official
duties and thus not as a citizen.”111 In so holding, the Second
Circuit pointed to language in Garcetti defining speech made
pursuant to one’s job duties as “speech that owes its existence to
a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”112 Further, it
portrayed the teacher’s filing of a union contract grievance as
“‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly
execute his duties.’”113
Lastly, most Circuits do not have a per se rule about whether
union-related speech is a matter of public concern.114 However,
some Circuits have stated that union-related speech is more
likely to be of public concern than not.115 Whether or not union
grievances are a matter of public concern may depend, in part,
on whether the grievance is individual or collective in nature. In
Ellins, the Ninth Circuit found that a collective union grievance
regarding department-wide problems was a matter of public
concern.116 Other Circuits have ruled that individual union
grievances are not of public concern.117

111. Id. at 201.
112. Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
113. Id. at 203.
114. See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2015);
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21, 40 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating
“the First Circuit has declined to endorse the notion that such speech, by its
nature, touch[es] on a matter of inherent public concern”) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original); Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 415
(7th Cir. 1995); see also Thomas v. Del. State Univ., 626 Fed. App’x 384, 388
(3d Cir. 2015) (discussing union grievances).
115. See, e.g., Meagher, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 40 (stating “union-related
speech ‘does point in the direction of finding that the speech involved a matter
of public concern’”) (citing Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir.
2008)); Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating
“speech in the context of union activity will seldom be personal; most often it
will be political speech”).
116. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir.
2013).
117. Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 580–82 (2nd Cir. 2016); Thomas, 626
Fed. App’x at 388; Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2010).
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II. Analysis
A. Janus Determined that Employee Speech on Behalf of
Public Unions is Speech as a Citizen and Almost Always a
Matter of Public Concern.
As discussed supra in Part I(A), Janus addressed the issue
of whether “union speech in collective-bargaining and grievance
proceedings should be treated like the employee speech in
Garcetti, i.e., as speech ‘pursuant to [an employee’s] official
duties.’”118
The union in Janus argued that agency-fee
supported union speech is “part of the official duties of the union
officers who engage in the speech.”119 In other words, the
AFSCME wanted the Court to declare that when an employee
who serves as union official or representative speaks during
collective bargaining or grievance procedures, that employee
speaks pursuant to his or her official job duties.
The Court rightly rejected this argument. In so doing, the
Court held that “when a union negotiates with the employer or
represents employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union
speaks for the employees, not the employer.”120 Thus, when a
public employee serving as a union official speaks on behalf of
the union writ large or on behalf of another individual employee
in either collective bargaining or grievance procedures, that
employee speaks as a citizen under Garcetti.121
The AFSCME and it amici were likely dismayed by the
Janus Court’s rejection of this argument. Evidently AFSCME
was willing to make any argument that would save the
constitutionality of agency fees. However, the Janus Court’s
holding regarding union speech under Garcetti actually helps
union members guard against retaliation by their employers for
their union activities. Specifically, whenever an employee
serving as a union official or representative speaks on behalf of
the union or one of its members, that employee speaks as a

118. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018) (citing Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 421) (emphasis in original) (alteration in original).
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis in original).
121. See id.
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citizen, and the Garcetti test does not apply.122
This holding is consistent with the Second, Sixth, Seventh,
and
Ninth
Circuits’
decisions
regarding
union
representatives.123 In those cases, the police officers served as
union officials, and the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits determined that the officers spoke in their capacities as
union representatives.124 The Janus Court’s holding makes
perfect sense with the facts of those cases: The officers, in
criticizing their respective employers publicly or during union
meetings, clearly did not speak on behalf of their employers. To
hold otherwise would suggest that the employer speaks to and
criticizes itself.125
However, Janus’ discussion of Pickering and its progeny
only addresses union representative speech and does not, on its
face, resolve the issue of whether employee speech made as an
ordinary union member or pursuant to union grievance
procedures is citizen speech. In some cases, a union member
speaks not on behalf of the union or another member, but rather
as an individual in their capacity as a union member or
pursuant to union-created grievance procedures. For example,
it would be difficult to characterize the teacher’s filing of a union
grievance in Weintraub as speech on behalf of the entire union
because the teacher’s grievance arose out of his individual
interactions with his superiors. Similarly, it seems likely that a
union member, who does not serve as a union official or
representative, often speaks for his or herself when criticizing
employer decisions at a union meeting. In such instances,
employees speak as individuals to their union or to their
employer. Part II(B)(ii), infra, addresses this issue further.
The Janus Court also held that union speech during
collective bargaining procedures is of public concern and that
union speech during grievance procedures frequently is as

122. See Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912–13.
123. See, e.g., Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir.
2013); Nagle v. Village of Calumet, 554 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 2009); Fuerst
v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006).
124. Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774; Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1111; Ellins, 710 F.3d at
1060.
125. See Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2474.
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well.126 AFSCME and its amici argued that speech by union
representatives during collective bargaining procedures was of
purely private interest.127 In reaching its decision regarding
collective bargaining, the Court relied on recent disputes
between AFSCME and the Governor of Illinois regarding the
impact of pension and benefit plans on the state budget.128 The
Court stated that to deny the public’s interest in these discussion
is to “deny reality.”129
However, the Court did not stop with state budgetary
issues; it also held that public unions can and often do address
virtually every political issue under the sun when they engage
in collective bargaining.130 Further, the Court held that union
speech during grievance procedures “may be of substantial
public importance and may be directed at the ‘public square.’” 131
Though it stopped short of declaring all union speech during
grievance procedures a matter of public concern, the Court’s
holding declared that nearly all speech made on behalf of a union
is political speech that implicates the First Amendment.132
Thus, nearly all speech on behalf of unions must also be of public
concern.133
Taken together, the Janus Court’s holdings regarding union
speech provide considerable First Amendment protection for
public sector employees who serve as union officials or
representatives. Because all speech on behalf of a union is
speech “as a citizen” and nearly all such speech addresses
matters of public concern, public sector employees who feel their
126. Id. at 2474–77.
127. Id. at 2474.
128. Id. at 2475.
129. Id.
130. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2475–76 (2018).
131. Id. at 2476.
132. Fisk, supra note 9, at 2062–63 (2018) (“[e]xplaining why collective
bargaining should be regarded as a form of political speech for which financial
support cannot be compelled, the five Republican-appointed Justices noted
that labor costs have a substantial budget impact and bargaining implicates
education, health care, anti-discrimination, and other policy . . . . But if all
union speech is political, that must mean that restrictions on union speech are
unconstitutional”).
133. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (defining matters of
public concern as those “relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community”); see also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912.
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employer retaliated against them because of their speech as a
union official or representative have all but cleared the initial
hurdles to First Amendment protection established in Connick
and Garcetti.134 To establish a prima facie case for retaliation
under the First Amendment, employees in these circumstances
need only convince the court that (1) their speech was the basis
for their employer’s retaliation and (2) that their interest in
speaking on behalf of the union outweighs their employer’s
interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”135
While the Pickering test does not guarantee that union
speech always outweighs an employer’s efficiency interests,
employees serving as union officials stand a much better chance
of winning their retaliation cases under Pickering’s balancing
test alone. For example, after the Court in Boulton determined
the sergeant made his comments as a citizen and that he
addressed matters of public concern, it quickly resolved the
Pickering balancing test in the sergeant’s favor by noting that
Sierra Madre County “presented no countervailing interest in
repressing his speech.”136 Similarly, in Ellins, the Court did not
even address the Pickering balancing test after concluding the
officer satisfied the threshold inquiry of citizen speech on a
matter of public concern.137 Lastly, the Second Circuit in Clue v.
Johnson concluded that transit employees’ speech was a matter
of public concern and immediately declared that their employer’s
interests in the efficiency of its services did not outweigh the
employees’ First Amendment rights.138
One might object that Janus, an agency-fee case, should not
alter the Court’s public employee speech jurisprudence.139
Indeed, the Janus Court prefaced its discussion of Pickering and
its progeny by noting that those cases are not a good fit for
analyzing agency-fee cases and suggesting that the two lines of
134. See Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912–13.
135. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); C HEMERINSKY,
supra note 27, at 1151.
136. Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 535 (6th Cir. 2015).
137. See Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1057–63. (9th Cir.
2013).
138. 179 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1999).
139. See, e.g., id. at 906–11 (addressing arguments that Janus’ holding
regarding matters of public concern is confined to agency-fees).
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cases should have no bearing on one another.140 In particular,
one might argue that Janus should have no effect on public
employee speech cases because (1) the agency fee cases involve
the speech of numerous employees while Pickering cases
typically address individual speech; (2) agency fees are a form of
compelled speech, and Pickering cases address speech
restrictions; and (3) the two lines of cases’ speech categorization
schemes do not line up perfectly.141
In response to such arguments, one commentator recently
argued that agency fees and public employee speech are closely
related and that the Court cannot limit Janus’ holdings to
agency fee cases, at least with regard to Janus’ holding about
matters of public concern.142 First, Pickering cases can involve
multiple employees,143 and the Janus Court did not limit its
holding to large unions only.144 The number of employees the
Government affects through its speech regulation should not be
of First Amendment significance.145
Second, while compelled speech and restricted speech are
distinct and raise somewhat differing concerns, it is certainly not
impossible that a Pickering case could arise when a government
employer compels (or attempts to compel) employee speech. 146
For example, imagine a government employer demands that a
union official quiet union members who are critical of

140. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–74 (2018); see also Baude
& Volokh, supra note 64, at 176.
141. See Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2472–74.
142. Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 914–18.
143. See, e.g., Killion v. Coffey, No. 13-1808 (RMB/KMW), 2016 WL
5417193, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 76 (3rd Cir. 2017).
144. Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 909.
145. See id. at 908–09.
146. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473. The Janus Court doubted that an
employer would compel an employee to speak on matters outside of the
employee’s job duties about which the employee disagreed. However, the
Janus Court acknowledged that such a scenario could arise and that Pickering
could apply, though it declined to decide that issue. Id. While government
compulsion of speech may implicate more serious First Amendment concerns
than restricted speech, as Lesczynski notes, the difference between compelled
speech is one of degree and not kind. Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 909. A case
of compelled speech may alter the Court’s application of the Pickering
balancing test, but it should not make a difference in its application of Garcetti
and Connick.
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management.147 If the union official refused and the employer
retaliated against the official, it seems likely that a court would
look to Pickering to resolve the case.
Further, the Court’s agency fee cases do cohere with
Pickering’s
framework.148
While
the
cases’
speech
categorizations do not line up perfectly, both lines of cases
fundamentally involve “the extent of the government’s authority
to make employment decisions affecting expression.”149 Both
Abood and Pickering deal with government employee speech on
similar subject matters that employees “direct[] (at least mainly)
to the employer.”150 Both cases allow the government to infringe
on employee speech rights only when it has a sufficient
managerial interest in doing so.151
Even if the Court could technically limit Janus’ holdings to
the agency-fee context, it would be hard-pressed to justify a
different analysis of union speech in public employee speech
cases. This seems especially true when considering Garcetti:
There seems to be no reason why the Janus Court’s conclusion
that union representatives speak for their unions during
collective bargaining and grievance proceedings would suddenly
change in the public employee speech context.152
Thus, though much of Janus is hostile to public union
interests, some aspects of the Janus decision actually help
147. See, e.g., Gloembiewski v. Logie, 852 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914–15 (N.D.
Ohio 2012), aff’d 516 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 890
(2013). In that case, a university employee and active union member circulated
a petition critical of the university’s sick leave policy during a university staff
meeting. Id. After confronting the employee, a university management official
approached the union President, who was also present at the meeting, and said
“[y]ou had better get control of [the employee] . . . she’s being grossly
insubordinate and . . . discipline [is] forthcoming.” Id. at 915. The union
President was not the plaintiff in that case (the employee was), but one can
imagine a First Amendment retaliation case arising under these facts. Id.
148. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 904.
151. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Abood discussed
public employers’ managerial interest in negotiating with a single union. See
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–22, 224–26 (1977).
152. See Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 2018)
(stating “it is hard to imagine a situation where a public employee’s
membership in a union would be one of his ‘official duties.’ This is especially
true in light of Janus . . . .”) (citations omitted).
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secure the rights of union officials and representatives to speak
on behalf of their union and criticize management decisions and
personnel without fear of retaliation. Further, courts should
extend Janus’ reasoning to include all public employees
speaking as union members or pursuant to union grievance
procedures.
B. Public Employee Speech Made as a Union Member or
Pursuant to a Union Grievance is Citizen Speech under
Janus, Lane, and Garcetti
1.

Lane Eliminates Broad Interpretations of Garcetti

In 2017, the Second Circuit refused to declare categorically
that “when a person speaks in his or her capacity as a union
member, he or she speaks as a private citizen.”153 Though the
Court did not explicitly say as much, part of the Second Circuit’s
rationale in reaching this decision appears to be its
unwillingness to overturn (or at least call into question)
Weintraub, which held that a public employee’s filling of a
grievance with his union was speech pursuant to his job
duties.154 The Second Circuit cited Weintraub as good law
throughout its decision,155 and though it arguably could have
distinguished union grievance filings from pure union member
speech,156 the Second Circuit’s categorical protection of union
member speech would at the very least undermine its holding in
Weintraub.
However, the Second Circuit should have
reconsidered Weintraub because it decided that case before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lane,157 and Lane significantly
153. Montero v. Police Ass’n of City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 398–
99 (2d Cir. 2018).
154. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2010).
155. See Montero, 890 F.3d at 396–99.
156. As the issue in Janus illustrates, an employee need not be an official
union member to take advantage of a union’s collectively-bargained grievance
procedures. See Janus 138 S.Ct. at 2460 (stating “protection of the employees’
interests is placed in the hands of the union, and therefore the union is
required by law to provide fair representation for all employees in the unit,
members and nonmembers alike”).
157. See generally Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2006); Weintraub, 593
F.3d 196.
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challenges the basis of Weintraub’s holding.158
To begin, there is some debate about the significance of the
Lane Court’s use of the term “ordinary job responsibilities.”159
Lane used that term to demarcate the line between citizen and
employee speech,160 but this language is a shift from Garcetti,
which utilized the term “official duties.”161 Some courts and
commentators have indicated that Lane’s shift in language could
narrow the types of employee speech excluded from First
Amendment protection.162 Other courts state that Lane’s shift
in terminology was meant to merely clarify and not modify
Garcetti.163 Still others avoid the issue entirely.164
While the Supreme Court has not commented on the shift
since Lane, this author believes that Lane’s shift in language
should narrow the scope of unprotected speech under the Court’s
Garcetti analysis. “Ordinary” is not synonymous with “official,”
and a plain reading of the two terms indicates that the Court in
Lane intended to limit the extent to which lower courts can
158. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 238–41.
159. See, e.g., John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the
Unanswered and Related Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J., 243, 261–64 (2017).
160. Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (stating “[t]he critical question under Garcetti
is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties”).
161. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
162. Rumel, supra note 159, at 262 (citing Dibrito v. City of St. Joseph,
No. 16-1357, 2017 WL 129033, at *3 (6th Cir. 2017); Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d
569, 582 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016); Alves v. Bd. of Regents, 804 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2015); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Gibson v.
Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2014); Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 295
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
2014)).
163. Id. at 263 (citing Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir.
2015); see also Fernandez v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 898 F.3d 1324, 1333
(11th Cir. 2018) (stating “[i]n Lane, the Supreme Court modified the phrasing
slightly, although not the substance of the question, and asked whether the
employee spoke pursuant to his ‘ordinary job duties”).
164. Rumel, supra note 159, at 263 (citing, inter alia, Cory v. City of
Basehor, 631 F. App’x 526, 529 (10th Cir. 2015); Lefebrve v. Morgan, No. 14CV-5322 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274584, at *10 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016)); see
also Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 959 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying Garcetti’s
“official duties” and Lane’s “ordinary” duties language without noting any
distinction); Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 881 F.3d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 2018)
(noting the difference in terminology in Garcetti and Lane but using language
from both cases in its recitation of the citizen speech test).
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define speech by public employees as part of their job
responsibilities.165 However, the remainder of this Article’s
analysis does not depend on the distinction, if any, between an
employee’s “ordinary” and “official” job duties.
What is clear in Lane is that the Court explicitly rejected
the Eleventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of Garcetti.166 The
Eleventh Circuit had declared that a public employee speaks
pursuant to his or her job duties when the speech in question
“owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional
responsibilities.”167 This is precisely the same standard the
Second Circuit applied in Weintraub. The Lane Court rejected
it by noting that “Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in
the course of public employment.”168 According to the Lane
Court, “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the
speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”169
The Third Circuit also relied on a broad interpretation of
Garcetti in Killon v. Coffey,170 when it refused to consider police
officers’ union member speech as citizen speech because it
involved “special knowledge” gained through the officers’
employment.171 However, Lane explicitly states, “the mere fact
165. See Rumel, supra note 159, at 264 (stating “a strong argument can
be made that the Court’s use of the adjective ordinary . . . could signal a
narrowing of the realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti.”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lemay Diaz, Truthful
Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech as a Citizen”: Why Lane v.
Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee Truthful
Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 586 (2016). Of course, ordinary and
official are not mutually exclusive terms either, and it is certainly possible that
the Lane court did not intend to limit Garcetti’s application. One can imagine
scenarios where an employee speaks outside of their ordinary job duties but
nonetheless appears to speak as an employee.
166. Lane, 573 U.S. at 239 (stating “[i]n holding that Lane did not speak
as a citizen when he testified, the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too
broadly”).
167. Id. at 235 (citing Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709,
710 (11th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)).
168. Id. at 239.
169. Id. at 240.
170. 696 F. App’x 76, 78–79 (3d Cir. 2017).
171. Id.
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that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue
of his public employment does not transform that speech into
employee—rather than citizen—speech.”172
Thus, to the extent Weintraub and Killon relied on overlybroad readings of Garcetti, one must reconsider their holdings
regarding union grievances and union member speech
generally.173 As discussed infra, the Court’s holding in Janus
provides additional reasons to reconsider those cases.
2.

The Purpose and Structure of Unions Indicates that
Public Employee Speech as a Union Member or
Pursuant to Union Grievance Procedures is Speech as
a Citizen.

Labor unions exist “for the purpose of advancing [their]
members’ interests in respect to wages, benefits, and working
conditions.”174 Specifically, “[u]nions seek to increase the
proceeds from work, improve the conditions under which work is
carried on, determine the rights of each individual worker, and
establish a mechanism by which these rights may be
protected.”175 To accomplish these goals, unions “establish a
united front of employees in dealing with the employer so as to
obtain the maximum concessions from him and to bring the
united power of the group to bear when any one of them suffers
a wrong.”176 A united front is necessary to secure these goals
because, according to unions, employers will not grant
employees such benefits on their own accord even when the
employer and the economy at large can afford to do so.177

172. Lane, 573 U.S. at 240.
173. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2010). The
Second Circuit also justifies its holding in Weintraub by arguing that the filing
of a union grievance has no “citizen analogue.” This Article addresses
Weintraub’s “citizen analogue” argument in Part II(B)(ii).
174.
Labor
Union,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/labor%20union (last visited May 17, 2019).
175. Joel Seidman, The Labor Union as an Organization, in INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICT 114, 115 (Arthur Kornhauser et al. eds.,1954).
176. Id.
177. Maurice S. Trotta, Understanding the Union, in DEALING WITH A
UNION 48 (Marceau Leroy ed., 1969).

25

ARTICLE 5_WRIGHT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

736

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:35 PM

Vol. 39.2

Once a group of employees unionize, the union typically has
the exclusive right to bargain with the employer on behalf of all
employees within a given workplace.178 As a part of the
collective bargaining process, unions will frequently seek to have
the employer agree to a grievance procedure through which
employees can report violations of the collective bargaining
agreement or complain of other management decisions. 179
Grievance procedures usually involve the aggrieved employee(s)
meeting with several levels of management with a
representative of the union.180 If the employer and the employee
are unable to resolve their conflict, then the employee can
submit the issue to binding arbitration.181
An employee joins a union by paying initiation fees and
regular dues.182 Once a member of the union, the employee has
the right to participate in union politics by voting in the election
of union officials or on other union matters such as whether to
strike or ratify a collective bargaining agreement.183 Union
members have the right to express their opinion on any of these
matters during union meetings.184
Though they have a shorter history in United States, 185
public sector unions exist to secure the same goals as their
private sector counterparts. However, unlike private sector
unions, state and local law governs the relationship between a
public sector union and state employers.186 Some states prevent
public sector unions from collectively bargaining with state
employers, and others allow collective bargaining but
significantly limit the scope of the process or only allow it for

178. See, e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018). However, some
states do not allow public sector unions to collectively bargain. See Joseph
Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 532 (2013).
179. Edward J. McMahon, Vital Interests of Employer and Union, in
DEALING WITH A UNION, 119 (Marceau Leroy ed., 1969).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Trotta, supra note 177, at 52.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Slater, supra note 178, at 512.
186. Id. (citing The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(2006)).
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specific types of public employees.187 Despite these obstacles,
public sector unions still exist in states that forbid public sector
collective bargaining, finding other ways to advocate for public
employees.188
Given the purpose and structure of unions, conflict between
a union and a respective employer is inevitable.189 This
inevitable conflict explains why an employee cannot speak
pursuant to their ordinary or official job duties when they speak
in their capacity as a union member.
When an employee speaks as a union member, that
employee assumes a role distinct from his or her employer. As
the Court stated in Janus, “when public employees are
performing their job duties, their speech may be controlled by
their employer” and “the employee’s words are really the words
of the employer.”190 However, when employees speak as union
members, they speak not for their employer, but for themselves
or their union coworkers. To hold that union members speak for
their employers when voting for union officials or expressing
their opinion on union matters would suggest that the employer
is in some sense electing union officials and establishing union
policies. To quote the Court in Janus, “[t]hat is not what
anybody understands to be happening.”191
This same rationale applies to employee’s initiation of union
grievance procedures.192 In raising a grievance, an employee
187. Id. at 512–13.
188. See Richard B. Freeman & Eunice S. Han, Public Sector Unionism
Without Collective Bargaining, Am. Econ. Ass’n. 2 (2012).
189. George C. Homans, Industrial Harmony As A Goal, in INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICT 48 (1954); Seidman, supra note 175, at 48.
190. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018); see also Weintraub
v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)
(stating”[w]hen an employee is engaged in speech that the ‘employer itself has
commissioned or created,’ then the employee is acting as an agent or a
mouthpiece of the employer, and the employer must have a substantial degree
of control over the employee’s execution of his responsibilities.”) (citations
omitted).
191. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.
192. Eric Marshall, Rescuing the Union Grievance from the Shoals of
Garcetti: A Call for the Return to Reason in Public Workplace Speech
Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 905, 921 (2013) (stating “when an
employee files a grievance, he is not speaking for the employer; he is speaking
for himself to the employer, invoking the rights accorded to him by his union
contract and protected by law” (emphasis in original)).
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asserts that management violated the collective bargaining
agreement or engaged in other problematic behavior.193 If the
employee speaks for his or her employer in filing a grievance,
then the employer is raising a complaint against itself and thus
“disputing its own actions.”194
Nonetheless, one might insist that even if an employee does
not speak for his employer when speaking as a union member or
in grievance procedures, an employee can still speak both as a
union member and pursuant to his or her “ordinary” or “official”
job duties. One factor courts consider in determining if an
employee speaks as a citizen is if the employee’s speech has a
“citizen analogue.”195 For instance, the Second Circuit held in
Weintraub that the filing of a union grievance has no “citizen
analogue” because it is “not a form or channel of discourse
available to non-employee citizens” and thus must be speech
pursuant to a teacher’s job duties.196
The Court in Garcetti established the “citizen analogue”
inquiry as a factor that courts may consider in determining if the
speech at issue is citizen or employee speech.197 However,
Garcetti states that this inquiry is not dispositive,198 and the
“citizen analogue” factor is particularly ill-suited for considering
the status of an employee’s union-related speech.199 One must
be an employee of some kind to join a union, and an employee’s
union-related speech will frequently have no citizen analogue
given the unique relationship between an employee’s union and
his or her job.200
Other factors courts apply in determining citizen versus
employee speech are similarly unhelpful for analyzing union
193. McMahon, supra note 179, at 119.
194. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.
195. See, e.g., Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203–04; see also Decotiis v.
Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011).
196. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204.
197. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
198. Id. at 420.
199. For a critique of the Weintraub court’s use of the “citizen analogue”
factor as it related to union grievances, see Marshall, supra note 192, at 920–
23.
200. See id. at 921 (stating that “when an employee files a [union]
grievance, he is not speaking for the employer; he is speaking for himself to the
employer, invoking the rights accorded to him by his union contract and
protected by law . . . “) (emphasis in original).
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member speech. For example, union member speech can occur
at the workplace and utilize workplace resources.201 Similarly,
union members can direct their speech up the chain of command,
such as when a union member speaks during a union meeting at
which management is present.
Another fact worth noting is that employers cannot require
workers to join a union.202 Though Weintraub notes that an
employer need not require speech in order for it to be pursuant
to an employee’s job duties, it is hard to imagine that an
employee’s union member speech is part of their job duties when
union membership itself is optional. Even an employer’s mere
expectation that an employee should join a union would be quite
strange considering the “inherent institutional conflict of
interest between an employer and its employees’ union” 203
discussed above. In his dissent in Weintraub, Judge Calabresi
doubts “that most employers would view union activity as
something that their employees do for the employer’s benefit.”204
Further, he notes the “distinct irony in the idea that unions,
which so many employers seek to exclude from the workplace,
are somehow transmuted into entities that ‘promote the
employer’s mission’” and thus become part of an employee’s
official duties.205
It is possible that an employer may require an employee to
raise any workplace complaints through a collectively-bargained
union grievance procedure.206 However, even if an employer did
201. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-5.12 (West 2018) (giving public
unions the right to conduct worksite meetings during lunch or non-work breaks
on the employer’s premises to discuss union matters).
202. N.L.R.B. v. Gen. Motors Corp, 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963) (holding that
a private sector employee in a “union shop” cannot be fired for failing to honor
any union-imposed obligations, such as formal union membership, except the
“duty to pay dues and fees”); 2 N. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Law
§ 25.08 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2018). But see Justice v. Danberg,
571 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D. Del 2008) (stating that Delaware law required a
public employee to be a member of a union, but not an active member). Janus
makes even the mandatory payment of dues and fees unconstitutional. See
generally Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
203. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
204. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 209 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 209 (stating “[i]t is possible that the union grievance was
an official part of a process by which employees brought subjects of concern to
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require utilization of union grievance procedures, that does
necessarily make those filings part of the employee’s “ordinary”
or “official” duties.
Garcetti states that the inquiry into whether an employee
speaks as a citizen is “a practical one” and that the “listing of a
given task in an employee’s written job description is neither
necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task
is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties.”207 This
suggests that an employer cannot simply transform an
employee’s filing of a union grievance into speech pursuant to
the employee’s job duties by including those activities in the
employee’s job description or requiring it as a matter of
government policy. Courts must look beyond formal job
requirements and examine the realities of an employee’s job
duties in determining when he or she speaks pursuant to them.
It is reasonable to expect an employee to raise certain workplace
concerns with their employer, but to suggest that it is an
employee’s job duty to raise them via a union’s adversarial
grievance procedure stretches the concept of job duties beyond
its reasonable limits.
Cases discussing union grievances also describe them as
procedures that are “internal” to or established by the
employer.208 This fact supposedly justifies, at least in part, the
conclusion that union grievance filings are a part of a public
employee’s job duties. However, it is unions that typically insist
on implementing these grievance procedures,209 hence their
description as union grievances as opposed to other types of
grievance procedures that exist. To describe union grievances
as entirely internal procedures to the employer ignores the
union’s fundamental role in creating and implementing them. 210
[the school system’s] attention, facilitating corrective action; if this were the
case, then Weintraub’s grievance might be pursuant to his official duties and
exempt from First Amendment protection”).
207. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006).
208. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204; see also Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555,
561–62 (7th Cir. 2010).
209. McMahon, supra note 179, at 119.
210. See Marshall, supra note 192, at 927–28 (discussing how New York
law protects employees’ right to file union grievance and would punish an
employer for unilaterally instituting grievance procedures without negotiating
with the union).
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Thus, under Janus, Lane, and Garcetti, there appears to be
little reason for courts to hold that union member speech and
union grievances are speech pursuant to an employee’s job
Lane eliminated the primary rationale for that
duties.
conclusion, and Janus provides strong reasons to conclude
otherwise.
3.

The Scope of Union Member Speech

So far, this Article has discussed union member speech
without precisely defining under what circumstances that
speech occurs. With the exception of cases involving union
grievances, most of the cases this Article discusses address
employer retaliation against a union official or representative.211
Few cases address ordinary union member speech, and even
Boulton and Montero, two cases that take opposing stances on
Garcetti’s application to union member speech, involve union
representatives.212 Further, the courts in most of these cases
accept without question the employees’ assertions that they in
fact spoke as union representatives.213
Courts that have addressed whether an employee spoke as
a union representative or member have focused on both the
content and the context of the employee’s speech. For example,
in Graber v. Clarke, the Seventh Circuit found that an employee
spoke as union Vice President when initiating union grievance
procedures on behalf of another employee, but not when
commenting on the well-being of specific jail deputies.214 The
Court found it significant that, in making the latter comments,
the employee did not mention the union or the collective
bargaining agreement at any point during the conversation. 215
The employee’s supervisor stated, “when Graber spoke about
union issues in the past, he always mentioned the union or its
211. See supra Part I(C).
212. Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2018);
Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2015).
213. See, e.g., Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534; Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre,
710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th
Cir. 2006).
214. 763 F.3d 888, 894–97 (7th Cir. 2014).
215. Id. at 897.
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members.”216
Further, the Court stated the employee’s
comments about the jail deputies were specific to the deputies
under his supervision, and if he had spoken as a union
representative, he “would have been concerned for all deputies
who were getting insufficient rest, not just those under his
control at the jail.”217
Another issue courts have considered is whether the union
itself sanctioned an employee’s speech or the forum in which it
occurred. In Olendzki v. Rossi, the Court found that a
government psychologist spoke as a union official when
representing another employee in a disciplinary meeting and
when speaking at union and labor management meetings.218
The Court stated, “these forums were sanctioned by the union as
a venue to allow [the psychologist] to voice concerns on behalf of
its members” and thus fall “outside of Garcetti strictures.”219
Similarly, in Gloembiewski v. Logie, the Northern District of
Ohio seriously doubted that an employee engaged in union
activity when circulating a petition critical of an attendance
policy agreed upon by her union and her employer.220 The Court
noted that the union “unequivocally disavow[ed]” the employee’s
stance on the attendance policy.221
This Article does not establish a precise framework for
determining when an employee speaks as a union member.
Courts must examine the content and context of an employee’s
speech in each case to make that determination. An employee’s
speech at a union meeting on union matters or during a labor
strike should almost certainly qualify as union member speech.
However, statements an employee makes at work during normal
work hours will require more careful analysis. Statements
which the union itself disavows may not qualify as union
member speech unless the context suggests otherwise, such as if
the union sanctions the forum in which the employee speaks.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
2012).
221.
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Id.
765 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 748.
Golembiewski v. Logie, 852 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 n.2 (N.D. Ohio
Id.
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Conclusion
Public labor unions certainly have reasons to lament the
Court’s decision in Janus. Unions that previously relied on
agency fees from nonmembers will see their revenues decline
significantly. However, as news of teacher strikes ripple across
the nation,222 it is clear that public sector unions are resolved to
carry on. This Article demonstrates that the First Amendment
can protect the interests of public unions from threat of employer
retaliation against employees for union-related speech.
Janus establishes that the First Amendment should protect
union officials and representatives from employer retaliation for
their union-related speech under most circumstances. Speech
on behalf of a union is not a part of their job duties and,
according to Janus, is almost always a matter of public concern.
With these hurdles cleared, union representatives must
demonstrate is that their First Amendment interests in
speaking outweigh their employer’s interests in maintaining
efficient operations. Union representatives should have little
trouble meeting that burden.
Janus’s rationale for union representatives should also
apply with equal force to ordinary union members and
employees utilizing union grievance procedures. Employees in
those circumstances speak for themselves, not their employers,
and to suggest otherwise runs counter to common sense.
Further, the very nature of unions and membership therein
makes it difficult to imagine how speech as a union member
could ever be a part of one’s job duties because such speech
nearly always implicates the inherent tension between employer
and union.
Nonetheless, employees speaking as ordinary union
members or pursuant to union grievance procedures have
additional burdens they must meet before the First Amendment
will protect them from employer retaliation. First, employees
must establish that they in fact spoke in their capacity as a
union member. Second, employees speaking as union members
222. Clare Lombardo & Anya Kamenetz, Oakland, Los Angeles And More
To Come: Why Teachers Keep Going On Strike, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/22/695957426/oakland-los-angelesand-more-to-come-why-teachers-keep-going-on-strike.
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still must establish that they spoke on matters of public concern.
Many circuits do not recognize a per se rule about whether a
public employee’s union-related speech addresses a matter of
public concern,223 and it seems reasonable to think that not every
union member comment or union grievance will address matters
of public concern.224
While public employees must address these concerns in
bringing First Amendment retaliation claims based on their
union-related speech, this Article demonstrates that Garcetti
should not pose an obstacle. This may be a small victory for
public unions in light of Janus’s primary holding, but it has the
potential to assist unions in their continued efforts to represent
public workers.

223. See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2015);
see also Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating “Courts
have recognized that such activity, in a broad sense, touches upon matters of
public concern.” However, the fact that an employee’s expression concerns a
topic of public import “‘does not automatically’ render his expression
protected”).
224. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (addressing employee
grievances, Connick states that “it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the
great principles of free expression if the Amendment’s safeguarding of a public
employee’s right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public
affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee
grievance.”); see also Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–73 (2018)
(stating “[s]uppose that a single employee complains that he or she should have
received a 5% raise. This individual complaint would likely constitute a matter
of only private concern and would therefore be unprotected under Pickering”).
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